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The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Allegheny
County on Appellant McMullin’s wrongful discharge claim.  The District Court later
entered judgment on a verdict in favor of defendants on McMullin’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims following a jury trial.  McMullin raises three issues on appeal.  McMullin argues
that the District Court erred by granting the County summary judgment on his claim that
he was improperly discharged by County Manager Cannon because the Commissioners
had not consented to his termination.  He also contends that the District Court erred by
excluding evidence that his position was a state mandated position and evidence by which
he intended to show that he was terminated as part of a purge of Dunn supporters. 
Finally, McMullin appeals the District Court’s refusal to charge the jury that the Director
of Veterans’ Affairs position was required by the Second Class County Code, 16 P.S. §
5123.  We will affirm.
1. At the time of McMullin’s termination in December 1997, Allegheny County was
dealing with a fiscal crisis because expenditures exceeded revenues and a reduction in its
bond rating which indicated instability to investors and made it more expensive for the
County to borrow money.  County government decided to reduce costs to balance the




The authorization that granted the County Manager power to terminate with
the consent of the County Commissioners specifies neither when nor how consent must
be given.  Consequently, even though their consent came post-termination, it was proper. 
Furthermore,  personnel matters are administrative functions and may be properly
delegated by elected County Commissioners.  See DeFrank v. County of Greene, 
412 A.2d 663 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). 
Under Pennsylvania law, McMullin was an at-will employee. Pennsylvania
law generally does not recognize a cause of action for termination of an at-will
employment relationship.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “steadfastly resisted any
attempt to weaken the presumption of at-will employment in this Commonwealth.” 
McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 290 (Pa. 2000). Courts
have recognized exceptions only for implied contract claims based on representations
made in an employee handbook and for public policy claims.  Stumpp v. Stroudsburg
Mun. Auth., 658 A.2d 333 (Pa. 1995).  The District Court found no evidence to show that
either exception applied to McMullin.  Indeed, there is evidence in the record that
McMullin was terminated due to budget constraints.1 
1. (...continued)
terminated a number of employees (approximately 80 to 100 in the fall of 1997 alone). 
“Unfunded” positions were those positions not subsidized by the state or federal
governments but instead funded from County taxes. “Funded” positions were those paid
for by either the state or federal government which approved a particular project and
needed personnel to staff it.  Obviously, eliminating funded positions would not increase
County revenue but eliminating unfunded positions would.  Certain areas of the County
government saw personnel increase (i.e., Allegheny County Jail) while other areas saw
personnel decrease (i.e., Division of Veterans’ Affairs).  See generally Joint Appendix
388-404 (Direct and cross examination of Mr. Carmen Torockio, former Allegheny
County Budget Director, describing how the County planned to reduce the deficit by
reducing unfunded personnel).
2. Judge Becker believes that this evidence was relevant but that its exclusion was
harmless error.
4
Next, the section of the Second Class County Code allegedly violated with
regard to McMullin’s official discharge document does not entitle him to bring a private
right of action for wrongful termination.  Instead, this section addresses the execution of
official instruments and mentions neither County employees nor the termination of
County employment.  See 16 P.S. § 3503.  Hence, the District Court properly granted
summary judgment on this claim.
At the trial on McMullin’s § 1983 claims, the District Court properly
excluded as irrelevant evidence that Pennsylvania law mandates that the position of
Director of Veterans’ Affairs always be filled.  The record does not show that any County
employee involved in McMullin’s termination even knew the statute existed.  The
exclusion of this evidence was well within the discretion afforded to the trial court under
Fed. R. Evid. 402.2
5Testimony by McMullin and Commissioner Dunn alleging that Dunn
supporters were terminated because of their political affiliation was properly excluded.
Such evidence could arguably be relevant, but McMullin’s proffer was inadequate to
support his contention that this evidence should have been introduced to the jury. 
McMullin sought to introduce evidence that only a handful of employees were terminated
for political reasons, when as many as 1,000 employees left their jobs in all. Furthermore,
McMullin did not sufficiently explain the link between the employees’ political affiliation
and their termination. Last, McMullin’s proffered testimony from Dunn, lacking any
specifics, was vague and without a proper foundation.  Therefore, the District Court acted
within its discretion in excluding the evidence.
III.
We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to Allegheny
County on McMullin’s wrongful discharge claim and that the evidence he sought to
introduce at trial on his § 1983 claims was properly excluded.  The order of the District
Court will be affirmed.
